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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue. The central issue on appeal is whether a general contractor owes an
independent contractor a duty of care to protect the independent contractor from an
open and obvious danger existing on the general contractor's premises.
Standard of Review. A grant of summary judgment is reviewed for
correctness. See Baczuk v. Salt Lake Regional Med. Ctr., 2000 UT App 225, f 5, 8
P.3d 1037.
DETERMINATIVE LEGISLATION
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or
regulations of central importance to this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case. The Plaintiff, an independent contractor, was hired
by the Defendant to perform work as a painter. The Defendant gave initial instruction
as to how the paint was to look, however, the Defendant did not direct, control, or
supervise the actual performance of the painting. While the Plaintiff was on
Defendant's property for the purpose of performing his work, the Plaintiff was injured
when he fell from a second floor balcony which balcony was missing guardrails. This
case involves the standard of care owed by the Defendant to the Plaintiff.
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. On or about March 21,
2000, the Plaintiff filed suit against the Defendant in the Fifth Judicial District Court
1

for Washington County alleging negligence, premises liability, and violation of
OSHA standards. The Defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds that
under Utah law, the Defendant owed not duty of care to the Plaintiff because the
Plaintiff was an independent contractor and the Defendant did not control the manner
or method of Plaintiff s performance. The trial court entered summary judgment for
the Defendant and dismissed the Plaintiffs complaint. The Plaintiff appealed to the
Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court transferred jurisdiction of the appeal
to the Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 1996, Defendant/Appellee Kurt Beckstead ("Beckstead") undertook the
construction of a home located in Santa Clara, Utah. (R. 75 ) The home was to be the
primary residence for Beckstead and his family. (R. 75.) Beckstead acted as his own
general contractor in the construction of the home. (R. 75, 101.)
Beckstead hired an independent contractor, Plaintiff/Appellant John D. Hale
("Hale"), to paint Beckstead's home. (R. 101). While Beckstead bought the paint
and generally told Hale how the paint should look, Beckstead did not control the
manner in which Hale was to paint the home. (R. 101.)
Hale entered Beckstead's home solely for the purpose of painting the same.
(R. 101.) Because the home was under construction, the guardrails that would
normally be m place were not yet installed on the second floor balcony of the home.
(R. 101.) Any danger posed by the missing guardrails was an open and obvious
danger. (R 102.) While inside the home and m the course of performing his work,
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despite the open and obvious nature of the danger posed by the exposed balcony, Hale
stepped off the balcony and fell to the first level of the home. (R. 101.)
On March 21, 2000, Hale filed a complaint against Beckstead in the Fifth
District Court for Washington County, alleging negligence, violation of the
Occupational and Safety Health Act (OSHA), and premises liability. (R. 1-6.)
Beckstead moved for summary judgment arguing that Hale was an
independent contractor and as such Beckstead owed no duty to Hale, thereby
precluding any recovery under a theory of negligence. (R. 58, 63.) Beckstead also
argued that the OSHA violations asserted by Hale in his complaint did not apply as
there is no private right of action for violations of OSHA. (R. 71.)
Hale opposed Beckstead's motion arguing there were insufficient facts and
evidence under which the trial court could enter summary judgment for Beckstead,
and that he was injured as a result of Beckstead's failure to install guardrails on the
second floor, not as a result of the performance of work for which he was hired. (R.
85-87.)
The trial court granted Beckstead's motion and entered summary judgment for
Beckstead. The trial court found that Hale "fell while on [Beckstead's] premises as a
business visitor or invitee, that [Beckstead] did not control or direct the manner of
[Hale's] work, and that any danger posed to [Hale] by the condition of [Beckstead's]
partially completed home was open and obvious to [Hale]." (R. 101.) Applying the
law to these findings, the trial court held that "[Beckstead] had no duty of care
towards [Hale] concerning the manner or method of [Hale's] work performance and
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the condition of [Beckstead's] property was not such that [Beckstead] would be
subject to liability to [Hale]..." (R. 102.)
Hale appeals.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
First, under Utah law, an employer of an independent contractor, who does not
control the manner or method of the work performed by the independent contractor,
owes no duty of care to protect or prevent injury to the independent contractor and
therefore cannot be held liable for such injuries.
In the instant case, Beckstead employed Hale as an independent contractor and
did not control the manner or method of the work performed by Hale. Therefore,
Beckstead owed no duty of care to protect Hale or to prevent the injury which was
suffered by Hale in the course of Hale's performance of his duties.
Second, Hale's argument as to the application of OSHA standards to the
standard of care owed by Beckstead to Hale is raised for the first time on appeal and
therefore should not be considered on appeal by this Court. Furthermore, to the
extent Hale asserts that the OSHA regulations create the standard of care owed by
Beckstead, the same are irrelevant because Beckstead cannot be held to a standard of
care where does not have a duty of care.

A

ARGUMENT

I.

THERE IS NO DISPUTE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT ALLOWING
THIS COURT TO DETERMINE WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT WAS
CORRECT AS A MATTER OF LAW.
At the outset, it must be noted that on summary judgment Hale did not

challenge Beckstead's assertion that Hale was an independent contractor. This
assertion was made by Beckstead in his memorandum in support of motion for
summary judgment and in Beckstead's supporting affidavit. (R. 62, 75; Addendum
B.) In response, Hale challenged Beckstead's assertion that Hale represented he was
a licensed, bonded, and insured contractor. (R. 89; Addendum C.)
Rule 4-501(2)(B) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration provides that on
a motion for summary judgment, "[a]ll material facts set forth in the movant's
statement and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be
deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically
controverted by the opposing party's statement." Therefore, because Hale never
specifically controverted Beckstead's statement that his status was that of an
independent contractor, the same is deemed admitted, regardless of whether the trial
court made a specific finding that Hale was an independent contractor.
Thus, for purposes of the instant appeal, the relevant, undisputed facts can be
summed up as follows: (1) Hale was employed by Beckstead as an independent
contractor; (2) Beckstead generally instructed Hale as to how the paint should look,
but did not control the manner or method of Hale's actual performance of the task,
which performance was solely in the discretion and judgment of Hale; (3) that the
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danger existing on the premises was open and obvious; and (4) that Hale was injured
in the course of his performance.1
Therefore, because there is no dispute as to any material fact, this Court may
determine whether summary judgment was proper as a matter of law. See Utah R.
Civ. P. 56(c).

II.

BECKSTEAD OWED NO DUTY OF CARE TO HALE TO PROTECT
HALE FROM THE OPEN AND OBVIOUS DANGER ON THE
PREMISES.
To prove negligence under Utah law, a plaintiff must show four things: "duty,

breach of duty, causation, and damages." Gerbich v. Numed Inc., 1999 UT 37, fl4,
977 P.2d 1205. The trial court granted Beckstead's motion for summary judgment
determining, as a matter of law, that Beckstead owed no duty to Hale. See Addendum
A, at 3. Therefore, the trial court dismissed Hale's complaint. See id.
On appeal, Hale argues that the cases relied upon by the trial court, Thompson
v. Jess, 1999 UT 22, 979 P.2d 322 and Dayton v. Free, 46 Utah 277, 148 P. 408
(1914), did not apply to the facts of the instant case, thereby requiring this Court to
reverse the summary judgment ruling. However, applying the facts in the instant case
to the most recent case on this subject, Thompson v. Jess, it is sufficiently clear that
under Utah law, Beckstead, as the employer of Hale, an independent contractor, did
not owe Hale a duty of care to protect him from the danger located on the premises.

1

With regard to Hale's actual injury, the trial court states that Hale fell and was injured
while inside the home. See Addendum A, at f 8. However, Hale admits in his affidavit
submitted in opposition to summary judgment that he "fell and was injured while
working at the home." Addendum C, Affidavit of John Hale, at f4.

In Thompson v. Jess, 1999 UT 22,979 P.2d 322, the Utah Supreme Court
reiterated the general rule in Utah that '"the employer of an independent contractor is
not liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor
or his servants.'" Id. at ^ 13 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 409). While
the language of this rule addresses harm to third parties, a common sense application
of the rule should include harm suffered by the independent contractor himself as a
result of his own act or omission. See, e.g.. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 409 cmt.
b (stating because employer has no control over manner in which contractor performs
work, contractor, not employer, has responsibility of preventing and bearing risk).
"This general rule recognizes that one who hires an independent contractor
and does not participate in or control the manner in which the contractor's work is
performed owes no duty of care concerning the safety of the manner or method of
performance implemented." Thompson, 1999 UT 22 at Tfl3. The reason for this rule
is that "where the principal employer does not control the means of accomplishing the
contracted work, the contractor 'is the proper party to be charged with the
responsibility for preventing the risk [arising out of the work], and administering and
distributing it.'" Id (quoting W. Prosser & W. Keaton, The Law of Torts 509 (5th ed.
1984)) (alteration in original).
In Thompson, the defendant, a motel owner, contracted with a company for
the purchase and delivery of pipe which she would use as a large sign post. See id. at
f 2. The company sent two of its employees to deliver the pipe. See id. atf3. The
defendant told the two where she wanted the pipe installed and then asked if they
would actually perform the installation. See id. The two agreed and undertook the
7

installation. See id. at ^[4. The extent of the defendant's involvement with the
installation was in advising the two where to install the pipe. See id. The manner and
method of the installation was left to the discretion and control of the two contractors.
See id. During the course of the installation, one of the employees (the plaintiff) was
injured. See id. f 5.
The plaintiff sued the defendant alleging she was negligent in the control she
exercised over the installation and in failing to take or require special precautions in
its performance. See id. ^[7. The defendant moved for summary judgment arguing
that because she did not direct or otherwise control the manner or method of installing
the pipe, she owed no duty of care to either of the two contractors to ensure they
installed the pipe safely. See id. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendant and the plaintiff appealed. See id. atfflf7-8.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed. See id. at f 36. Although the
defendant gave initial instruction to the plaintiff and his fellow contractor, it
amounted to nothing more than control over the desired result, which, the court
reasoned, is not sufficient to give rise to a duty of care. See id. at ^[24. The court
reasoned that because the defendant did not direct, control, or supervise the actual
performance of the installation, she was not an active participant in the same and
therefore had no duty of care to the plaintiff to ensure the installation was performed
properly. See id.2
2

The doctrine of "retained control" referred to by the court in its analysis is one of two
exceptions to the general rule that an employer owes an independent contractor no duty
of care. The other, which the court analyzed in Thompson, is the doctrine of "peculiar
risk" or "inherently dangerous work". See Thompson, 1999 UT 22 at Iffl 14, 27. Hale
8

The instant case is factually similar to Thompson insofar as in the instant case,
like the defendant in Thompson, Beckstead's initial instruction to Hale as to how the
paint should look was to effect a desired result. The manner and method of
accomplishing that result was entirely within the discretion of Hale. Indeed, at the
time Hale undertook performance of the work for Beckstead, Beckstead was out of
town and therefore not in a position to exert any control or supervision over the
manner or method of the work.
Furthermore, Hale's presence on Beckstead's premises was for the limited
purpose of performing the work he contracted to perform, and during the course of
performing that work he was injured. Therefore, applying these facts to the supreme
court's reasoning in Thompson, Beckstead owed no duty of care to Hale, and
therefore cannot be held liable for the injury suffered by Hale in the performance of
the work for which he was contracted to perform.
Therefore, the trial court was correct in granting Beckstead's motion for
summary judgment.
III.

THE CASES RELIED UPON BY HALE ARE FACTUALLY
DISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE INSTANT CASE AND ARE
THEREFORE INAPPLICABLE.
Hale argues that Thompson does not apply to the facts in the instant case. He

asserts that in the instant case, his injury occurred as a result of "a dangerous
condition on the premises which was created or existed independent of the manner in
which the contractor undertook his performance." (Appellant Brief, at 7.) Hale
does not argue that the peculiar risk doctrine applies to the instant case, and indeed there
is no evidence in the record to suggest that Hale's performance of a residential paint job
involved a peculiar risk or inherently dangerous work.
9

asserts that even though Beckstead did not control or direct the performance of Hale's
work, Beckstead was in possession of the premises and therefore owed Hale a duty of
care of that owed by land owner to an invitee. (Appellant's Brief, at 7-8.)
Hale relies on two main cases to support of his argument, Silvas v. Speros
Construction Co., 594 P.2d 1029 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979), and Laws v. Blanding City,
893 P.2d 1083 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
In Silvas, a subcontractor on a construction site was injured when he fell
through one of several different holes on the roof of a building under construction.
See Silvas, 594 P.2d at 1031. The subcontractor had fallen through the hole as aresult of being distracted in his attempt to avoid another one of the holes. See id. The
general contractor argued that he owed no duty of care to the injured subcontractor
because the subcontractor knew of the holes and appreciated the danger posed by the
same. See id.
Relying on comment f to section 343 A of the Restatement, the court
determined that the general contractor may have had a duty of care even though the
danger was known and obvious to the subcontractor, because the situation was one in
which the general contractor may have had reason to suspect that the subcontractor
would have been distracted or otherwise would have forgotten to protect himself from
the danger. See id.
In the instant case, Hale presented no evidence, as did the subcontractor in
Silvas, that he was distracted from the open and obvious danger presented by the
absence of guardrails on the second floor balcony. Indeed, Hale presented no
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evidence to suggest that Beckstead should have expected that Hale would suffer
physical harm despite the open and obvious nature of the danger.
In Laws, the plaintiff fell from a dumping platform at a city dump and sued the
city alleging his injuries were caused by the city's negligent construction and
maintenance of the dump. See Laws, 893 P.2d at 1084. The plaintiff appealed a jury
verdict for the city, arguing that a jury instruction failed to adequately state the law on
the duty of care the city owed to the plaintiff. See id. 1084-85. The instruction was
taken from section 343 of the Restatement, but failed to take into account section
343A, which the court determined, must be read in concert with 343. See id. at 1085.
Quoting from comment g of section 343 A, the court stated that despite the
open and obvious nature of a danger which exists on the premises, the fact that the
premises have been held open to the visitor, and that he has been invited to use them,
is always a factor to be considered in determining that reasonable care has been used
to make the premises safe. See id. Further, the court found determinative the fact
that the owner of the premises was a governmental entity/public utility which has
made its premises open to the public, which public is therefore entitled to expect
reasonable safety while using the premises. See id. at 1085-86.
Laws is distinguishable from the instant case insofar as Laws did not involve
the use of premises by an independent contractor who had undertaken to perform
work which performance was subject to his own control and discretion. Furthermore,
Beckstead is certainly not a governmental entity or public utility under which the duty
of care, as implied by the court in Laws, is perhaps greater than that expected of a
private property owner or general contractor.
11

Appellee does not dispute that there is some conflict between the cases relied
upon by Hale and Thompson regarding the duty of care. This conflict is due in part to
case law which stands for the proposition that a workman who comes onto land to
make improvements, alterations, or repairs is owed a duty of care by the landowner
which is equivalent to that owed to a regular invitee. See English v. Kienke, 848 P.2d
153, 156 (Utah 1993).
The fact remains, however, that in Thompson, the most recent case addressing
the duty of care owed in circumstances as are present in the instant case, the Utah
Supreme Court applied section 409 of the Restatement and its exceptions as set forth
above. It did not cite to or address sections 343 and 343 A of the Restatement or
Hale's possible status as an invitee. Therefore, because the facts in the instant case
parallel those in Thompson, Thompson must be applied, and its application results in
a finding that Beckstead owed Hale no duty of care.
IV.

HALE'S ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OF
OSHA REGULATIONS TO THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF
CARE CANNOT BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL BECAUSE SUCH
ARGUMENTS WERE NOT RAISED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.
Hale argues that OSHA regulations are relevant in determining the appropriate

standard of care in the instant case. In his complaint, Hale asserted that Beckstead
violated OSHA regulations relating to guardrail protection for employees. Beckstead
moved for summary judgment on the issue, asserting that there is no private right of
action under OSHA. See Addendum B, at 11. Hale did not respond to this argument.
See Addendum C. The trial court agreed, and granted summary judgment on the
issue to Beckstead. See Addendum A, at 4.
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Now, for the first time on appeal, Hale asserts that his OSHA cause of action,
which is clearly delineated as such in his complaint (R. 3), was not a cause of action
at all, but rather the appropriate standard of care to govern this case. It is a well
established rule that, absent plain error, this Court will not address issues raised for
the first time on appeal. See Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996).
Should this Court reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment, it
should remand the case back to the trial court to allow it to determine the applicability
of OSHA regulations in determining the standard of care. However, if this Court
affirms the trial court, and rules that Beckstead did not owe Hale a duty of care, the
OSHA regulations which Hale asserts set the standard of care, are irrelevant.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Beckstead respectfully requests that this Court
affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Beckstead.

DATED THIS _ 0 L day of December, 2002.

Brent M. Brindley
Bryan J. Pattison
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
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IN THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JOHN D. HALE,

)
Plaintiff,

)

vs.

)

KURT BECKSTEAD, and
JOHN DOES I-V,

)

RULING ON MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 000500437
Judge G. Rand Beacham

Defendants. )

This matter came before the Court for hearing on January 10, 2002 pursuant to
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment which was filed July 20,2001. The motion was
opposed by Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition which was filed September 7, 2001.
Defendant also filed a Reply Memorandum on September 19, 2001. Having read the
memoranda and supporting affidavits, having heard the arguments of counsel, and having
reviewed the file for this action, the Court rules as follows:
FACTS
Although there are minor quibbles as to some details of the facts presented by
Defendant's Motion, there is no genuine issue as to the following facts:
1.

Plaintiff complains in this action of injuries he received in a fall.

2.

Defendant was the owner of the property at which Plaintiff fell.

3.

A home was under construction on Defendant's property, and Plaintiff was

inside the partially-completed home, at the time of Plaintiff's fall.
4.

Defendant was acting as his own "general contractor" for the construction of

the home.
5.

Defendant hired Plaintiff to paint the home.

6.

Defendant told Plaintiff generally how the paint should look, and bought the

paint for Plaintiff to use.
7.

Defendant did not control or direct the manner in which Plaintiff was to paint

the home.
8.

While inside the partially-constructed home, Plaintiff inadvertently stepped off

a second floor balcony and fell to the first level.
9.

There is no evidence that Plaintiff had authority to enter Defendant's premises

for any purpose other than to complete his contract to paint the home.
10.

Defendant was not in the home when Plaintiff fell, but was out of town on an

extended vacation.
There are no genuine issues as to any other material facts.1
*It has been the experience of this Court and others at the trial court level that the facts on which we rely
are occasionally changed at the appellate court level, even to include facts which were not presented to the trial
court at all. This appears to result occasionally from appellate attorneys failing to give the appellate courts a
complete record of the facts as they were presented to the trial court. On a motion for summary judgment, this
Court feels constrained to consider only those facts which are presented in compliance with Rule 4-501 of the Utah
Rules of Judicial Administration, and it is this Court's opinion that an appellate review which extends beyond
those facts is a de novo review rather than an appeal and, therefore, is erroneous. Consequently, this Court
emphasizes that this Ruling is based on the set of facts specified above.

ANALYSIS2
Plaintiffs Complaint asserts claims titled '"Negligence," "Violation of Statute,
Ordinance or Safety Order," and "Premises Liability." Defendant seeks summary judgment
as to each of these claims.
Plaintiffs first and third claims both fail on the issue of Defendant's duty to Plaintiff
under the circumstances presented in this case. This Court is persuaded that Plaintiff fell
while on Defendant's premises as a business visitor or invitee, that Defendant did not control
or direct the manner of Plaintiffs work, and that any danger posed to Plaintiff by the
condition of Defendant's partially completed home was open and obvious to Plaintiff.
Consequently, under current law, Defendant had no duty of care toward Plaintiff concerning
the manner or method of Plaintiffs work performance and the condition of Defendant's
property was not such that Defendant would be subject to liability to Plaintiff under the facts
of this case.3

^This Court is fully aware of the now-frequent instruction of the appellate courts for the trial courts to
make a more extensive analysis in rulings such as this. See, e.g., Gabriel v. Salt Lake City Corp.. 2001 UT App
277,431 Utah Adv. Rep. 7. That instruction is not always realistic, however. First, the caseloads of the trial
courts continue to increase while many courts' time and resources remain stagnant; for example, the judicial
resources in this district have remained the same for over 12 years in spite of the overwhelming growth in the
population and case filings in the district. Second, appellate reviews of summary judgment decisions of the Utah
district courts resulted in a reversal rate well over 50% in reported cases decided in the Utah appellate courts in the
year 2000. In light of the huge caseloads carried by the trial courts, the time required for the drafting of a detailed
ruling, which is more likely to be reversed than to be affirmed, is often too great a luxury for a trial judge to afford.

3

This Court expresses no opinion as to whether the current law should change or may change upon further
review by an appellate court. But see, e.g., Kessler v. Mortenson. 2000 UT 95, 16 P.3d 1225.

Plaintiffs second claim alleges liability based on Defendant's alleged violations of
provisions of, and/or regulations under, the federal Occupational and Safety Health Act or
«Q§jj^» Defendant has cited strong authorityforhis argument that OSHA does not permit

CONCLUSION
There are no genuine issues of material fact before this Court, and Defendant is

Motion is hereby granted, and Defendant's counsel is hereby directed to submit an
appropriate judgment pursuant to RJA Rule 4- S04
Dated this £> ;*:

February,
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G. RAND BEACHAM, JUDGE

Certificate of Mailing or Hand Delivery
I hereby certify that on this 11 day of

YJAP

, 2002,1 provided true and correct

copies of the foregoing RULIN G to each of the attorneys/parties named below % placing

George, Utah and/or by placing a copy in the United States Mail,first-classpostage prepaid,
and addressed as follows:
Aaron J Prisbrey
Attorney for Plaintiff
Brent M. Brindley
Robert Lamb
Attorneys for Defendant
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

ii 11\\ ii M i n' w,v:;i IINTI ON r.ouN n, STATE OF UTAH
JOHN D. HALE,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,

Casti lln liniNIM'Mi

vs.

Judge G. Rand Beacham

KURT BECKSTEAD,
and JOHN DOES l-V.,
Defendants.

Defendant Kurt Beckstead, by and through, Snow Nuffer, a Professional
Corporauu

l

support of his Motion for Summary Judgment.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS1
1.

This incident arose when the Plaintiff fell while painting the interior of a

home located at 1975 West Rimview Drive, Santa Clara, Washington County, Utah
(hereinafter the "Home""

mplaint fflf7

For purposes of summary judgment, Defendant does not dispute the referenced allegations of Plaintiffs
Complaint, because Defendant believes that even if true, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. Defendant
reserves the right to dispute previously denied allegations of Plaintiffs Complaint at later stages of the
litigation.

2.

Defendant undertook as a general contractor to build the Home at issue in

this matter. (Complaint H 7).
3.

Defendant

with building the Home hired Plaintiff as a sub-

contractor for the interior painting of the Home. (Complaint ffij 7,17).
4. . ' Fil HI ni ni 11 ni III! in fiiestiilt ml lii II i d t i lift" 11 ill Hi ill In 'i i . .in IK nnsnl IIUIIKIIII IIIIIIIII
insured painting contractor. It was later determined that Defendant was none of these
things. (Affidavit of Kurt Beckstead || f 5)
5.

Defendant gave Plaintiff general instructions and guidelines, but left it to

the professional discretion and expertise of Plaintiff, as an independent contractor, as
I ( AI i |":'iii
6.

I'"1 '"»*••'I* MI |"«' I'i'h ig IIK:I inlorinrof the Homo (hi, | t)

•

• •

On September 20s 1996, at approximately 5:30 p.m., while painting the

j n t e r j o r 0 |- ,|^le | _ j o m e ^

I

fell to the first level, which fall allegedly caused his injuries. (Complaint fflf 7, 12)
7.

At the time of this accident, Defendant

.-:

n

fact, Defendant was out of town on an extended family vacation. (Beckstead Affidavit, fl
8).
8.

On March ?1, ?000, Plaintiff filed the above-captioned lawsuit asserting

claims for negligence, OSHA violations and premises liability. (See Complaint
generally).

ARGUMENT
II
The Utah Supreme Court has established the prima facie elements of a
negligence claim, as follows: ( I) tl le defendant owed the plaintiff a duty; (2) there was a
breach of that cllli it> ; (3) the breach was the actual and proximate cause of the injury
complained of; and, (4) the defendant suffered damages. Gerbich vr Numec* Uw v77
P i i l mi t;(Y) (i f mi ni in ini 1 i i i i i i HI hi i HI li niiii mi i fhtifl ' d HI

i

tit i

P.2d 848-51 (Utah 1994); Weber vs. Springville City, 725 P.2d 1360-63 (Utah 1986 If
there was no duty owed by the defendant to the plaii itii III! I ' till lie m v sglu.

s

and no liability attaches.
a) No Duty Owed to Independent Contractor
In Utah, the law is well established that "one who hires an independent contractor
and does not participate in or control the manner in which the contractor's work is
prTli'ii'tiirrl owi i -i i|lii,!li,1 ' I iJifi" i -nil in i iiiiiiiiiii i Hi! "iiX1'!', i I llii 1 in'ini'ifi

' i i 11 v > > r I nf

performance implemented." Thompson vs. Jess, 979 P.2d 322 (Utah 1999) (emphasis
added), wo dlsa Dayh i /«- I

i

INIII'l II ill If1! IIII Il I ' l H l Ill Illnl i u llli Il i i-miili iv

•

owner that does not control the work the independent contractor has no duty to provide
a safe workplace to the employees of the independent contractor). I I ie two
authoritative cases in this area of the law are Thompson, and Dayton.

b) Thompson vs. Jess
As indicated above, Thompson stands for the proposition that a landowner owes
nil ni I II i miII |i In (ill mi I "I mimi11 II i iv i1*1 IMII din ill i( 1III if IH1< ill 11 mil iMi I lliiiiii iiheir tin1 ILmdnwnpr rlrnir, in I
participate in or control the manner in which the independent contractor carries out its
c
commonly accepted reason for this rule is that, where the principal employer does not
control the means of accomplishing the contracted work, the contractor is the proper
party to be charged with the responsibility for preventing the risk arising out of the work,
and administering and distributing i f

Thompson, 979 P.2d 325, citing, W, Prosser & W

b

In Thompson, the plaintiff, an employee of an independent contractor hired by
the defendant landowi iiei fc ill istall a lar ge steel post 01 i tl le llatti
when the steel post broke lose and rolled on him. Id. at 324 The injured employee
brought a negligence action against the landowner claiming that the landowner was
"negligent in the control she exercised in the installation of the pipe and in failing to take
or require special precautions in the performance of the job " Id The landowner later
moved fc in si immary judgment a -

did not exercise control ov

independent contractor on the project, and therefore, had no duty to the independent
c

entered

landowner.
In reviewing the case on appeal, the Utah Supreme Court was not required to
consider the no-duty to independent contractors1 rule. Conceding the application of the

no-duty rule, the employee instead asserted o n appeal that the exceptions (see
discussion o n exceptions infra) applied to create a duty of care n »landowner to the independent contractoi. The Thompson

j T O m the

Court examined these

exceptions, but in the end affirmed the lower Court's decision that the landowner owed
r
In our case, Defendant, the landowner, hired Plaintiff, the independent
contractoi , to perform painting services iiiiiii

IIIH IIIM

Il

Il Hi Il l< ill!

(1,1 , ,11

If 4). In doing so, Defendant left it to Plaintiffs professional expertise and discretion as
to h o w to carry out the task,

i HIT 6, 7). In fact, at the time of the accident, Defendant

w a s c i it ::: • Il ' t ::: i i i m :: i i \ acatioi i itll i his family, exercising no control over Plaintiff or over •
the project. (Id 1 8 ) This case is a classic example of an employer hiring a n
indepei
w a s to be accomplished. A s such, the Thompson

rule cited above, and the Dayton

case, discussed infra, make
o w n professional j u d g m e n t a n d discretion o n how to accomplish the painting task. \iu.,

n e, /).
c) Dayton y. Free
To a large extent, the Thompson Court relied upon the foundational case Dayton

employed by an independent contractor who was hired to build a tunnel for the
|anC|0Wne|L J | l e e m p | 0 y e e

was

J n j ure( j w ^ e n

a

"mJgSeC|

g

employee then brought a suit against the landowner for negligence a n d failing "to notify

or warn him of the missed hole". Dayton, 148 P. at 409. The landowner argued that the
Plaintitr

an employee of an independent coi iti actor, that hi > II i Il 11

control over the employee, and therefore, Ilad no duty to him. #u.

' In action or

jury ruled in favor

of the injured employee.
t i l l npppHl llliii 11 I i ni II mi i ill 11 mi< ii ni mii1 f'i null II nil il ii I Hi ill HIM

ni|ili ice i/i.n

in iiiii|iil yci

of an independent contractor and not employed by the landowner. The Court held that

employee The Court reasoned that since the landowner had "neither reserved or
exercised direction or control on the work . . .[the landowner] owed him no duty t n
provide a safe place to work, 01 to warn or notify him
dangers incident tc

the work." Id. at 401-2.

I

of

employer may be held liable for the negligent act of an independent contractor:
The general rule that the employer of an independent contractor is not liable for
an injury resulting to a third person from a tortious act committed by himself or
his servants is subject to three exceptions: (1) where the injury was the direct
result of the stipulated work; (2) where the work was intrinsically dangerous,
and the injury was a consequence of the failure of the contractor to take the
appropriate precautions; (3) where the injury was caused by the performance of
an absolute duty owed by the employer to the complainant, individually, or to the
class of persons to which he belongs. Id. at - I II Ill
I n I " in f i i i ! Ill i

mi III i I iiiiiiiiill

jinic Hi ided that none of these exceptions applied or

attached liability to the landowner. Because of the potential applicability to the present
case, the three exceptions to the general no-duty rule will be discussed in turn.

(i) Injury as the Direct Result of the Work.
The first exception to the general rule of non-liability is where the "injury was the
direct result of the stipulated work." Id. The Dayton Court explained that this exception
applies "where the work which the contractor is employed to do is wrongful in itself, or if
done in the ordinary manner would result in a nuisance." Id. at 412. In Dayton, the
Court ruled this exception did not apply because "the injury... was not a direct result of
the stipulated work." Id.
The same rule applies to the case at Bar. In the present case, the injury did not
result from the work itself, but rather from the manner in which it was performed and the
methods used, or not used, to provide fall protection. Further, for this exception to
apply, Dayton requires that the injury complained of be the result of work which was
"wrongful in itself, painting the inside of the Home certainly does not qualify as
"wrongful" or a "nuisance". Thus, the first exception to the general rule of non-liability
does not apply.
(ii) Intrinsically Dangerous.
The second exception to the general rule of no-duty is where the work is
"intrinsically dangerous."2 In Dayton, the plaintiff argued that underground tunnel
blasting was "intrinsically dangerous", and therefore, the exception applied. The Court
did not agree. In coming to its conclusion, the Court asked,

2

Some courts refer to this exception as the "inherently dangerous" exception while others refer to it as the
"intrinsically dangerous" exception. There is no difference between the two terms, and they will be used
interchangeably throughout this memorandum.

"Dangerous to whom? Here, only to those engaged in or about the work. So is
feeding a threshermachine or working at sawmilling dangerous. An
inexperienced employee, unguarded against attendant dangers and attempting
such work, may probably be injured. Who, if anyone, owes him duties of warning
and protection? He who employed or directed or controlled him, or directed or
controlled the threshing or sawing. Certainly not the farmer, who did no more
than merely contract with the thresher to thresh his grain, or with the sawmiller to
saw his timber". Dayton, at 412. (Emphasis added).
In Thompson, see supra, the injured employee of the independent contractor
argued on appeal that the general rule of non-liability did not apply because the
placement of the steel pipe was "inherently dangerous." Thompson, 979 P.2d 328. In
relying on "Dayton and Tenth Circuit case law applying Dayton" the Thompson Court
held that the "inherently dangerous" exception has "no application to employees of
independent contractors performing the work at issue . . . but rather [to] innocent third
parties." Id at 331. Citing Eutsler vs. United States, 376 F.2d 634, 636 (Tenth Circuit
1967).
The rule under Dayton is that if the job is dangerous "to those engaged in and
about the work," but not to innocent third parties then it does not qualify under the
"inherently dangerous" exception. The Thompson Court took this reasoning to its
logical step by holding that the "inherently dangerous" exception does not apply to
injured employees of the independent contractor (and thus to the independent
contractor himself), but rather it applies only to innocent third parties.
In this case, the work performed was not inherently dangerous to Plaintiff. Under
the standards set forth above, Plaintiffs task of painting the Home does not qualify as
"inherently dangerous". Further, because it was the independent contractor, not an

innocent third party that was undertaking the performance of the task, the exception
does not apply. Accordingly, the second exception is not a basis to overcome the noduty rule.
(iii) Absolute Duty.
The third and final exception is where a landowner owes an absolute duty to the
employee of the independent contractor or the independent contractor individually. As
set forth above, the Utah Supreme Court has already held that an owner who does not
control or direct the work has no duty to provide a safe work place to the independent
contractor, or the employee of the independent contractor. Dayton, 148 P. 408, 412. In
none of the cases discussed herein has this third and final exception operated as a
viable exception to the no duty rule. Nevertheless, because the Plaintiff has asserted,
among other things, that he was a "business visitor" (i.e. an invitee), and that the
Defendant had a duty to protect him as an invitee, this third exception will be
discussed3.
The Utah Courts have adopted the Restatements approach to standards of care
owed to an invitee. In English vs. Kienke 848 P.2d. 153, (Utah 1993) the Utah Supreme
Court, in citing Restatement (Second) of Torts §343, stated:
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees
by a condition on the land if, but only if, he
a. Knows or by exercise of reasonable care would discover the
condition and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of
harm to such invitees, and
3

Plaintiffs does not claim there was an "absolute duty" to protect him as an invitee. In addressing
Plaintiff as an invitee for purposes of this memorandum Defendant is not conceding his status as such.

b. Should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or
will fail to protect themselves against it, and
c. Fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the
danger.
English, 848 P.2d at 156, quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts §343.
In the case at bar, Defendant did not owe Plaintiff a duty as an invitee because
there was no "unreasonable risk of harm," and the danger was so open and obvious
that the landowner could reasonably expect that the danger would be discovered.
Plaintiff was a contracted painter hired to perform painting on the inside of a home that
was in the progress of being constructed. He, like any other subcontractor, enters a
home under the reasonable expectation that not all of the phases of construction are
complete. As a subcontractor, he has a duty to protect himself and watch-out for open
and obvious dangers that might exist, and assume the risk of such dangers.
Furthermore, Defendant had every reason to assume that the Plaintiff, who had
represented himself as a qualified and professional painter, would notice that the railing
was not in place and work accordingly, using appropriate scaffolding and any other such
equipment (i.e. a tether) to assure safety. In short, it is completely reasonable for any
prudent person to assume that a professional painter would notice the railing was not inplace and take measures to protect himself.
Accordingly, even if the Plaintiff was an invitee, this is a case where a duty to
protect him does not apply. The "risk" of the unprotected balcony was not
"unreasonable" as to a sub-contractor.

II.
NO PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER OSHA
Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant is liable to him under the Occupational and
Safety Health Act (hereafter "OSHA"). In his Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant
violated 29 C.F.R. §§1926.501 and 1926.502, as they relate to guardrail protection for
employees. (Complaint fflj 8-15.)
OSHA is simply not applicable, and can carry no weight in the outcome of this
matter. The established rule in the Tenth Circuit, as well as in the majority of other
jurisdictions, is that OSHA does not "contain statutory provisions permitting a private
cause of action for personal injury." Westine vs. Gonzalas Construction Company, 103
F.3d 145 (Tenth Cir. 1996); Jelenic vs. Campbell Plastics, 159 F.3d 1347 (Second Cir.
1998); 41 F.3d 547,553 (Ninth Cir. 1994); Reis vs. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 960
F.2d 1156-1164 (Third Cir. 1992); Donovan vs. Square D Co., 709 F.2d 335, 338-339
(Fifth Cir. 1983); see also, Ellis vs. Chase Communications, Inc. 63 F.3d 473-477 (Sixth
Cir. 1995) (holding that the OSHA Act does not create a private right of action for
violation of its terms);
Based on this rule, Plaintiff cannot maintain a private cause of action against
Defendant on the alleged OSHA violation. The Tenth Circuit, has clearly established
that an OSHA violation cannot serve as the basis for a private cause of action.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant requests that his Motion for Summary
Judgment be granted. Defendant, as landowner, owed no duty to Plaintiff. The rule in

Utah is clear, a landowner/employer owes no duty to an independent contractor when
the former has not retained or exercised any control or direction over the employee or
over the project itself. The limited exceptions to this no-duty rule do not apply to the
present case. Further, OSHA does not provide a private cause of action. Accordingly,
there being no genuine issue of material fact the Defendant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law and respectfully moves the Court for such an order.
Respectfully submitted this jrjD_ day of July, 2001.
Snow Nuffer
A Professional Corporation

BRENT M. BRINDLEY
Attorneys for Defendant

i
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JOHN D. HALE,

AFFIDAVIT OF KURT BECKSTEAD
Plaintiff,

vs.
Civil No. 000500437
Judge G. Rand Beacham

KURT BECKSTEAD,
and JOHN DOES l-V,
Defendant.
STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

)ss.
)

Kurt Beckstead, first being duly sworn on his oath deposes and says as follows:
1.

I am competent to testify and have personal knowledge of the matters

stated in this Affidavit.
2.

I am, and have been at all material times hereto, the owner of the

premises located at 1975 West Rimview Drive, Santa Clara, Washington County, Utah.

3.

In the fall of 1996,1 undertook, as general contractor, to construct the

home located at 1975 West Rimview Drive, Santa Clara, Washington County, Utah,
(herein after "Home"), to be the primary residence for me and my family.
4.

I served as general contractor on the Home, and in that capacity hired

Plaintiff, John D. Hale, to serve as a sub-contractor for the interior painting of the Home.
5.

Plaintiff represented to me that he was licensed, bonded, insured and

otherwise qualified to act as the painting sub-contractor for the Home.
6.

With respect to the painting of the interior of the Home, I gave general

instructions and guidelines on how I would like the painting to look, but otherwise left it
to Plaintiffs professional expertise and discretion, as a painting sub-contractor, as to
how to carry out and perform the painting task.
7.

Plaintiff was left to his own judgment and discretion in performing and

completing the interior painting of the Home, and I exercised no control over the day-today performance of the task.
8.

On September 20,1996, when the Plaintiff allegedly fell, 1 was out of town

on an extended vacation with my family.

DATED this 2&

day of J k ^ -

, 2001.

' KURT BECKSTEAD

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

c2G&

day of.

2001.
• l i i ^

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at: Washington County
My Commission Expires:

m m*k

GA1LFULDE
NotoyPUbfc
State of Utah
^ComnrUBVtoipacl&an

TabC

Aaron J. Prisbrey #6968
Attorney for Plaintiff
1071 East 100 South Bldg D Suite 3
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone 435-673-1661
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JOHN D.HALE,
Plaintiff, I MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND REQUEST FOR HEARING
KURT BECKSTEAD, and JOHN DOES I
THROUGH V
v.

Defendants,

Case No. 000500437

COMES now the Plaintiff, John D Hale, by and Ihiou^h ioiin->el A,,nori I Prisbrt

hereby

offers this objection to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgement.
I. DISPUTED STATEMENT OF MATERIAL *AC1S
1.

Paragraph 1 of the "Statement of Material Facts" alleges that, "[fjhis incident arose when

the Plaintiff fell while painting an interior of a home located at 1975 West Rim View Drive,
Santa Clara, Washington County, Utah." and cites to the complaint at paragraph 7 and 12.
This is a clear misstatement of the (ompl.unt Paiav^raph UMIK umipLunt alleges as
follows:

1

On or about September 20,1996, Defendants did so carelessly, negligently and
recklessly own, maintain, occupy, lease, supervise, control, build, erect, design and/or
construct those certain premises located at or near 1975 West Rimview Drive, Santa
Clara, Washington County, Utah in such a manner as to create a dangerous and
hazardous condition of which Defendants knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care
and diligence should have known existed in sufficient time prior to this incident to
have warned or cautioned the Plaintiff and/or to have corrected and/or remedied such
condition, which Defendants carelessly and negligently failed to do, such acts and/or
omissions of which Defendants carelessly and negligently failed or refused to do,
such acts and/or omissions of the Defendants directly and proximately resulting in
injuries and damages to the Plaintiff.
Paragraph 12 indicates:
As a result of Defendant's failure to comply with 29 C.F.R. 1926.501 and 29 C.F.R.
1926.502, Plaintiff fell in excess of six feet and sustained substantial injury to his
person.
There is no allegation in the complaint, and indeed no evidence, that Plaintiffs fall was the
result of painting, as alleged in paragraph 1 of the Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendant's
have created this "fact" out of thin air and it should be stricken in it's entirety.
2. Paragraph 3 indicates that, "Defendant, in connection with building the home hired
Plaintiff as a subcontractor for the interior painting of the home." Defendant relies upon the
complaint at paragraph 7 and 17 for this proposition. How ever, pai agraph 7 provides as follows:
On or about September 20,1996, Defendants did so carelessly, negligently and
recklessly own, maintain, occupy, lease, supervise, control, build, erect, design and/or
construct those certain premises located at or near 1975 West Rimview Drive, Santa
Clara, Washington County, Utah in such a manner as to create a dangerous and
hazardous condition of which Defendants knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care
and diligence should have known existed in sufficient time prior to this incident to
have warned or cautioned the Plaintiff and/or to have corrected and/or remedied such
condition, which Defendants carelessly and negligently failed to do, such acts and/or
omissions of which Defendants carelessly and negligently failed or refused to do,
such acts and/or omissions of the Defendants directly and proximately resulting in
injuries and damages to the Plaintiff.
Paragraph 17 indicates that:

:

On September 20,1996, Plaintiff was a business visitor on the premises of Defendant,
2

having gone there at the express or implied invitation of the Defendant in connection
with the mutual business between Defendant and Plaintiff.
There is no reference nor indication in the complaint as to whether Plaintiff was a
subcontractor. This is simply a legal conclusion of Defendant without factual support and hence,
paragraph 3 should be stricken in it's entirety.
3. Plaintiff disputes paragraph 4, that, "Plaintiff represented he was a licensed, bonded,
insured painting contractor." (See Affidavit of John D. Hale at paragraph 2 filed herewith).
I Plaintiff disputes paragraph 5 that, "Defendant gave Plaintiff general instructions and
guidelines, but left it to the professional discretion and expertise of Plaintiff, as an independent
contractor, as how to perform the task of painting the interior home." (See Affidavit of John D.
Hale at paragraph 3 filed herewith.)

II. POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
A. BECKSTEAD HAS PROVIDED THE COURT NO FACTS TO SUPPORT IT'S CLAIM
Beckstead had not provided any facts to support it's claim. Instead, he simply sets forth
"facts" which are not supported by the record. There are not proper cites to the report to support
the majority of the "facts" set forth in Defendant's motion as required by R u It" 4-501 (2)(A).
Rule 4-501(2)(A) states as follows:
I he points and authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin
with a section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which movant
contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in separate numbered
sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the
movant relies.

3

As such, there is nothing upon which the Court can issue it's decision and Beckstead's
motion should be denied.
B. BECKSTEAD'S CLAIM THAT THOMPSON V. JESS IS CONTROLLING IS MISPLACED
Assuming, for the sake or argument, there are facts upon which the Court can issue a
decision, Defendant essentially argues that Utah law immunizes a land owner from liability
whenever an independent contractor goes on the landowner's premises, irrespective of the
negligence of the landowner. This is a blatant misinterpretation of the Utah Supreme Court's
holding from Thompson v. Jess 979 P.2d 322 (Utah 1999).
Utah law, and indeed the Court in Thompson, determined that a landowner is immune from
liability for physical harm caused to another by "an act or omission of the contractor or his
servants/' Thompson 979 P.2d at 325. (Emphasis added).
"The most commonly accepted reason for this rule is that, where the principal employer
does not control the means of accomplishing the contracted work, the contractor 'is the proper
I»iiity to Iti" tliiii'i't'il Willi tiit" irspoiisihilily I'IH* presenting flit" risk [arising out til tlif" work],
and administering and distributing it.'" 979 P.2d at 325 citing W. Prosser and W. Keaton, The
Law of Torts Section 509 (5th Ed. 1994). (Emphasis added).
The rule of law as set forth in Thompson, is quite clear. When a landowner retains an
independent contractor to come onto the landowner's property for the purposes of performing a
task, the landowner is not responsible for the negligent actions of the independent contractoi
while performing the duties for which he has been hired by the landowner.
Thompson was such a case. There, the Defendant motel landowner, Jess, hired AmeriKan
Sanitation to deliver a 20 foot long 8 inch steel pipe to the motel for installation vertically over
4

an existing pipe stub. Two employees of AmeriKan Sanitation, Dennis Jensen and the Plaintiff,
Trevor Thompson, attempted to install the 20 foot pipe over the stub and in the process the pipe
was dropped on Thompson's leg which was later amputated below the knee. (Id. at 323-24).
Thompson and his co-employee were negligent in performing the tasks for which they had been
hired as independent contractors by Jess. As such, the Thompson court dismissed Thompson's
claims.
Unlike Thompson, Hale was not injured as the result of the performance of work for which
he was hired. Hale was hired to paint the home. He had absolutely no responsibility foi \\w
construction of the home including installation of rails on the second floor, which is the basis for
Hale's claim. Beckstead negligently failed to install <i mil i n Hit >i \ und flooi ol the home. If
the Court were to adopt the analysis promoted by Defendant, a landowner would be immune
from all ot I he landowners tortuous where the Plaintiff happened to be an independent
contractor.1
CONCLUSION
Beckstead had not provided any facts to support it's claim. Instead, he simply sets forth
"facts" which are not supported by the record. As such, there is nothing upon which the Court
can issue it's decision. Further, Beckstead's reliance on Thompson is misplaced. Utah law is
fairly clear that when an independent contractor is hired to perform a specific job for a
landowner, and is negligent in the performance of those duties, the landowner rannot be held
x

Under Beckstead's analysis, a homeowner could dig a pit 20 feet deep in his yard and hide
it from detection. If an independent contractor fell in the hidden pit, the homeowner would be
immune from liability because the Plaintiff was an independent contractor. Such a reading of
Thompson is absurd. Hale was hired to paint. He was not hired to construct a second floor without
rails.
5

liable for the negligence of the independent contractor in performing those duties. However,
Defendant's interpretation of Utah law that would allow a landowner to escape liability for the
landowner's negligent conduct is wrong.
Wherefore, Plaintiff respectfully requests that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
be denied or, alternatively, that a hearing be held in this matter.
DATED this 7 day of September, 2001.

taron,
Attorney for Pfeifitiff
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I deposited in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid a \mv and corral copy of
the foregoing instrument in the above referenced matter this

<

day of September, 2001,

addressed to the following:
Steven E. Snow
Brent M. Brindley
Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom, Drake, Wade & Smart
192 East 200 North, Third Floor
P.O. Box 400
St. George, UT 84771-0400

6

John Hale
172 North 3980 West
Hurricane, UT 84737

Aaron J. Prisbrey #6968
Attorney for Plaintiff
i071 East 100 South, Bldg. D, Suite 3
St. George, Utah 84770
Telephone 435-673-1661
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON CO1
STATE OF UTAH

JOHND.HALE,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN D. HALE

v.

Case No. 000500437

KURT BECKSTEAD, and JOHN DOES I
THROUGHV
Defendants,

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF WASHINGTON

)
ss.
)

I, John D. Hale, being first duly sworn, states and alleges as follows:
1. I am the Plaintiff in the above referenced matter and have personal knowledge regarding
the information contained herein.
2. That your affiant never represented to Defendant, Kurt Beckstead, that your affiant was a
licensed, bonded, insured contractor.
3. That your affiant was hired by Defendant, Kurt Beckstead, to paint the interior of the home
located at 1975 West Rim View Drive, Santa Clara, Utah. Defendant gave your affiant
instructions on how to paint and also provided your affiant with all paint in order to
perform the work.

4. On September 20, 1996, your affiant fell and was injured while working at the home,
which is the subject matter of this lawsuit, located at 1975 West Rim View Drive, Santa
Clara, Utah, because there was no protective rail on the secondfloorof the home.
5. Your affiant's accident and injuries have nothing to do with the job of painting or the
manner in which the painting was performed.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAITH NAUGHT.
DATED this ^
.-ofr^

da

y of September, 2001.

TJOTAKY WBliC

\fe?08~i$h

I

E. 100 So.
j
si c 1227
zzzizr^
i

f \*\ %$m
m
* \&Srm&im? f$*

St

George, Utah 34790
My Commission Expires

j \ £ S ^ ^
February 25,2002
^ ^ J ^ A S T A T E OF UTAH

On the _[

/ /. *

|
1

\

ZP' *—:

/2^Z-

JohxyEf. H a l e

day of September, 2001, personally appeared before me John D. Hale, the signer

of the foregoing Affidavit of John D. Hale, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

0 J^g-

TARY PUBLIC
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be deposited in the U.S. Mail a true and correct copy of the
foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN D. HALE on this _7

day of September, 2001, addressed to the

following:
Steven E. Snow
Brent M. Brindley
Snow, Nuffer, Engstrom, Drake, Wade & Smart
192 East 200 North, Third Floor
P.O. Box 400
St. George, UT 84771-0400

John Hale
172 North 3980 West
Hurricane, UT 84737
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Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts, § 409
Restatement of the Law, Second, Torts
Copyright (c) 1965, The American Law Institute
• Case Citations
Rules and Principles
Division 2 - Negligence
Chapter 15 - Liability of an Employer of an Independent Contractor
Restat 2d of Torts, § 409
§ 409 General Principle
Except as stated in §§ 410-429, the employer of an independent contractor is not
liable for physical harm caused to another by an act or omission of the contractor or
his servants.
COMMENTS & ILLUSTRATIONS: Comment:
a. The words "independent contractor" are used throughout this Topic as describing any
person who does work for another under conditions which are not sufficient to make him a
servant of the other. It is immaterial whether the work is done gratuitously or is done for
pay, or, indeed, if the latter, whether it is done under a specific contract or under a general
contract of employment. As stated in the Restatement of Agency, Second, § 2, Comment b,
an agent may be either an independent contractor or a servant while engaged in work
necessary to the exercise of his functions as agent.
b. The general rule stated in this Section, as to the nonliability of an employer for physical
harm caused to another by the act or omission of an independent contractor, was the original
common law rule. The explanation for it most commonly given is that, since the employer has
no power of control over the manner in which the work is to be done by the contractor, it is
to be regarded as the contractor's own enterprise, and he, rather than the employer, is the
proper party to be charged with the responsibility of preventing the risk, and bearing and
distributing it.
The first departure from the old common law rule was in Bower v. Peate, 1 Q.B.D. 321
(1876), in which an employer was held liable when the foundation of the plaintiff's building
was undermined by the contractor's excavation. Since that decision, the law has progressed
by the recognition of a large number of "exceptions" to the "general rule." These exceptions
are stated in §§ 410-429. They are so numerous, and they have so far eroded the "general
rule," that it can now be said to be "general" only in the sense that it is applied where no
good reason is found for departing from it. As was said in Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Kenny Boiler
& Mfg. Co., 201 Minn. 500, 277 N.W. 226 (1937), "Indeed it would be proper to say that the
rule is now primarily important as a preamble to the catalog of its exceptions."
The exceptions have developed, and have tended to be stated, very largely as particular
detailed rules for particular situations, which are difficult to list completely, and few courts
have attempted to state any broad principles governing them, or any very satisfactory
summaries. In general, the exceptions may be said to fall into three very broad categories:

1. Negligence of the employer in selecting, instructing, or supervising the contractor.
2. Non-delegable duties of the employer, arising out of some relation toward the public or the
particular plaintiff.
3. Work which is specially, peculiarly, or "inherently" dangerous.
REPORTERS NOTES: This Section has been changed from the first Restatement by
eliminating the cross-reference to §§ 410 to 429, which is now included under Comment
b. Also by eliminating the word "tortious." No change in substance is intended.
Comment b: As to the English law, see Chapman, Liability for the Negligence of Independent
Contractors, 50 L.Q. Rev. 71 (1934). As to the history, present status and probable future of
the American law, see Morris, The Torts of an Independent Contractor, 29 III. L. Rev. 339
(1935); Harper, The Basis of the Immunity of an Employer of an Independent Contractor, 10
Ind. LJ. 494 (1935); Douglas, Vicarious Liability and Administration of Risk, 38 Yale LJ. 584
(1929); Steffen, Independent Contractor and the Good Life, 2 U. Chi. L. Rev. 501 (1935);
Report of New York Law Revision Commission, 411-688 (1939).
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